



215097 "Truth" Copy
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HINTS

TO

PENNSYLVANIA DEMOCRATS.

The following is a copy of a letter received lately by a democratic citizen of Bucks county, who thinking the matter contained in it worthy of the attention of leading men of our party, has caused a few copies to be printed, and asks you to peruse it carefully and consider it candidly.

August 25, 1826.

DEAR SIR.—When I was at your house, lately, we talked of politics; and with equal attachment to the democratic party we differed as to some questions of party policy.

I have reflected anxiously on the subject, and offer you my thoughts,—perhaps they may deserve consideration.

The democratic party, in our state, are in danger, I think of being led into a most pernicious error;—that of requiring pledges from our congressional candidates to support general Jackson as candidate for the presidency.

I object to this policy because it goes far towards *pledging* the whole party to his support, and because such an irregular, unprecedented, and premature commitment of the party will be in violation of our principles, in plain contradiction to our practice, and calculated to destroy our permanent ascendancy in the state. Let me explain my reasons.

I make no objection against Jackson. I know him to be a great soldier, and a good man; but speaking as a *democrat* to a *democrat*, I say he has no exclusive claim as matter of *right* to the support of our party.

Military exploits are to a certain extent a strong recommendation, but I appeal to the conduct of the democratic party to prove that military character is not, according to the principles of our

party, *of course* a reason for elevating the brave and meritorious soldier into civil office.

Jefferson the great and illustrious leader of the party, the first choice of the democrats, was not a soldier. Many of the soldiers of the revolution still survived; some were distinguished members of the democratic party;—the democrats of that day were not insensible to their merits, but wisely preferred as their candidate a man of different qualifications. At the end of Jefferson's administration some of the heroes of the revolution still remained, and one was chosen for the *federal* candidate, but the democrats again judiciously selected a man of other than military claims or war-like character.

During Madison's administration the war was begun and ended. The brilliant course of general Jackson was run, his claim to the gratitude of the nation was acquired, his great character established.

The democratic party did justice to his merits, their applause and gratitude were not withheld from the men that had filled up the measure of their country's fame. Wherever he travelled his journey was a triumph; and except the progress of Lafayette, no man has ever yet received a more brilliant reception in every town he visited.

But when a successor to Madison was to be chosen, the democratic party did not think it incumbent on them to prove their gratitude by making him their candidate; they honoured and applauded him and Brown and M'Donough whose victories all were splendid proofs of American valour, and Jackson chiefly perhaps, [although M'Donough's victory was much more important] but true to the principles which had governed them in the selection of Jefferson and Madison, they adopted Monroe for their candidate, in preference any of these.

I say therefore, confidently, that the principles of the democratic party which should be carefully preserved; the example of their past conduct, which ought not to be departed from, do not *bind* us *now* to make general Jackson our candidate *on account of his military services or exploits as a warrior*.

Nor does his character as a virtuous citizen, impose such an *obligation* upon us.

There are to be found in every state legislature, and at home in every county, men who possess the same virtues; every candidate ought to be wise, honest and patriotic, but it is not every wise, honest, and patriotic citizen that can be the chosen candidate of the democratic party, for the presidency.

From among such men the choice is to be made, but it is no disparagement to any one *not* to be chosen.

When the choice is made, by a convention or other means which concentrates and ascertains the general will of the party, then every true friend to the party will feel himself bound to support the candidate selected, but I contend for liberty to prefer any one I like best *until then*.

Since neither the military services, nor the private worth of general Jackson give him an exclusive claim on our support in preference to other distinguished and deserving democrats;—on what foundation can such claim be said to rest?

Not, I think, on his having been the candidate of the party at the last election.

We have undiminished confidence in him, to be sure, but what then? does that imply that we are bound to make him our candidate again? not at all, according to the principles heretofore acted upon by the party.

The choice of a candidate is not an election for life, nor do candidates receive their appointment like judges, to hold “during good behaviour,”—that is, until convicted of some crime or misdemeanor. It was part of general Hamilton’s plan, of a constitution, to have senators and a president, as well as judges, *for life* or until impeached and convicted of crimes. But this would not be a very republican arrangement, nor would it be consistent with the principles of the democratic party to appoint a candidate to hold his appointment, as such, for the same indefinite period. We do not admit the *divine right of kings*; and we must be cautious not to establish a doctrine of the divine right of presidents or presidential candidates, which would be nearly as bad.

If general Jackson were now actually president, he would have no right to ask us to pledge ourselves to support him at the *next* election, and surely never having been elected, he can have no stronger right.

What has been the practice of the democratic party? At every election new nominations are made. The same men are often, for various reasons, again adopted, but not as a matter of *duty and allegiance to them*, but of free choice made at the moment of nomination.

William Findlay was the candidate of the party in 1820, there was no diminution of confidence in him in 1823, yet another candidate was adopted. Now on the principles contended for by those who wish to pledge the party at once to general Jackson, this was wrong, and governor Findlay was entitled to our support again. The party did not admit the charges made against him by his enemies, for they elected him to a seat in the senate of the United States, but they exercised their free choice and selected John Andrew Shulze as the candidate of the party in 1823.

Further, we have seen that the party did not consider the nomination of Mr. Shulze made in 1823 as obligatory upon them in 1826, for although certainly no loss of confidence in governor Shulze had occurred, yet a new convention was deemed proper and necessary to make a new nomination, and it will be conceded by all, that up to the time of the meeting of that convention, or at least up to the time of appointing the delegates, the party were not obliged to adopt governor Shulze, but every man belonging to it was free to avow a preference for another democrat as candidate.

As soon as the nomination was regularly made, it became in-

cumbent on every democrat to support governor Shulze. So will it be incumbent upon us all to support the presidential candidate whenever he is regularly nominated, whether general Jackson be, or be not the man selected; but until that nomination, the party are not bound, and ought not to be considered bound to support him or any other individual; and all *pledges*, now imposed or required, of support to an individual not yet adopted as the democratic candidate, are contrary to the policy, the principles, and the practice of the party, and dangerous to its interests.

Since, then, neither the general's military exploits, nor unblemished private character, nor the fact of his having been the candidate on a former occasion, necessarily bind us to support him again, on what other foundation does this claim to our allegiance rest?

It is asserted in general terms in the circular lately issued by the Jackson committee of Philadelphia, that there were circumstances attending the last presidential election, which render it incumbent on the democratic party to elect general Jackson at the next, and much is said (though nothing definite) about "treachery" "spurning the will of the people," "violation of the principles of 1776," "defying," "repelling and insulting constituents," &c. &c.

Now all this sort of declamatory rhetoric I take to be entirely unworthy of a sober minded man's consideration, "let facts be submitted to a candid world," and if from *them* any absolute reason can be drawn for tying us to general Jackson's chariot-wheel, for making us put on the livery of an individual, and departing from the uniform practice of the democratic party, then I yield my assent, but I require facts and arguments, not vague assertions and flighty rhetoric, to convince me; and so I am sure will you.

As to the *will of the people*, if it be meant the people of Pennsylvania, I have already spoken of that; if it be intended that the will of the people of the United States was *spurned* or disregarded, in the conduct of the house of representatives on whom the election devolved, I will show you in a minute that the assertion is an audacious untruth.

The *fact* is undeniable that general Jackson did not receive the support of a majority of the people. Whether the people ought to have supported him, I do not inquire, but I know they did not. How will you test it? By the electoral vote in the first place; he had ninety-nine out of two hundred and sixty-one votes; no one can call this a majority. He had the votes of eight states entire, and shares of other states equal to two more; in all *ten* states out of *twenty-four*; clearly no majority.

But it is said he had a plurality, and a plurality ought to rule where there is no majority, and that he was the second choice of those whose first choice could not be elected. All three of these allegations are contradicted by the *facts*, if you will look at them.

1. I say he did *not* receive the support of a plurality of the people of the United States.

To ascertain this, you must look *through* the artificial arrange-

ments of our constitution, and see the real state of the polls as they tested the wishes of the people.

You know that small states have an electoral vote out of proportion to the population. Thus Delaware, Rhode Island, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Alabama and Louisiana, have together an electoral vote equal to Pennsylvania, though they have a representation in the popular house of congress, not much more than half as large as ours; the same inequality prevails every where, and though so far as the election by electors is concerned, we submit to be out-voted by states having only half so many people; yet when you talk of the will of the people, you look through this factitious construction of our government, and count the unanimous wish of Pennsylvania as much more considerable in the scale, than that of the much smaller number of people in those small states.

Strike off therefore the two electors who represent not the people, but the state sovereignty, and you come to the real popular vote. Well, Jackson having the votes of ten states to make up his ninety-nine votes, and Adams the votes of seven and about a half to make up his eighty-four votes, we must take twenty from Jackson's ninety-nine and fifteen from Adams' eighty-four, to put this matter in its true light; this leaves Jackson seventy-nine and Adams sixty-nine. But this is not all.

When we speak of the people of the United States, we mean the freemen, not the *slaves*. Now the slave-holding states are allowed to vote for their slaves, *as property*. South Carolina is entitled to five members of congress for her white population, having less than one fifth of the population of Pennsylvania; but has actually nine, four being for her slaves. And you will find by looking at the number of slaves in the Carolinas, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Tennessee, that those states have *ten* members of congress, and of course ten electors, for their slaves. Those states voted for general Jackson, the ten votes should therefore be deducted, and his actual vote as indicating the support given to him by freemen was sixty-nine.

I do not mean to say that slaves really vote, but their masters vote for them. One Carolinian with five slaves has a vote equal to four Pennsylvania farmers, the property of the slave-holder being represented, but the property of the Pennsylvanian not being counted. In making laws I agree that the representatives of two hundred and thirty thousand Carolinians, shall out-vote the representatives of three hundred and fifty thousand Pennsylvanians, but in calculating *popularity*, and estimating the will of the people, we must allow the larger number of freemen to be a majority.

Adams had no support from the slave-holding states, that would amount to an electoral vote; his support from freemen therefore was equal to the general's.

2. If you are not satisfied with this way of estimating the vote, still I say a plurality does not necessarily govern, as a majority

does, and again I appeal to the principles and practice of the democratic party.

I need not say that the constitution expressly devolves a *free* choice upon the house of representatives from among the *three* highest on the return, and that the members had sworn to act according to the constitution, and of course to make a *free* choice. The democratic party have established the principle, independent of the constitution, that a plurality of votes is not entitled to be considered as indicating the will of the people.

When a speaker of the house of representatives was chosen a few years since, Taylor of New York had at first a plurality of votes, but instead of acquiescing in this show of strength, they proceeded with their ballots till Barbour of Virginia was chosen. Did the democratic party call this a contempt of the will of the people?

When a senator was chosen by our legislature to succeed Mr. Lowry, general Marks had not at first even a plurality, but was, notwithstanding, elected.

And for a stronger example, look at the convention which nominated a candidate for governor in 1823. At the first ballot, Bryan had forty-one, Shulze thirty-five, and Ingham twenty-five. The delegates came to represent the sentiments of the democratic party in the different counties. Here was unequivocal proof that a plurality of the democratic party desired George Bryan for the candidate. The cases are analogous, and if it was incumbent on congress according to democratic principles, to follow the lead and *of course* elect the candidate having a plurality of votes, it must have been equally so, on the same principles, on the members of our convention. It is remarkable that Bryan was just as much ahead of Shulze, as Jackson was ahead of Adams, as ninety-nine is to eighty-four, so is (within a fraction) forty-one to thirty-five.

Yet what was the conduct of these delegates? They made Mr. Shulze the candidate, and the democratic party sanctioned and approved the act, by the firm support they gave to Mr. Shulze, by adhering to him since, and lately again adopting him for their candidate.

Can democrats be so inconsistent as to proclaim one principle of conduct to govern one set of electors and another for another? And will not the adopting or sanctioning the present assertion of the Jackson committee, bring disgrace and future evil upon the party?

General Jackson's *plurality* of electoral votes then (supposing he had a plurality) did not on democratic principles entitle him of course to the support of congress, and no principle was violated in disregarding the fact of the *plurality*.

It remains then only to see what were the circumstances which are referred to when the terms "treachery," "corruption," "insulting constituents," &c. are used in application to that election.

To whom are these tremendous denunciations meant to attach? Not to *our* members, surely, for they voted for the general.

Not to the members from the six New England states, for they voted as their constituents and *their* electors had voted, and no democrat can find fault with *that*.

Not to the New York members, I presume, because that state had given twenty-six out of thirty-six votes to Adams, and only *one* to Jackson. The members from New York would have given a strange example of republicanism in voting for the candidate who had received so trifling a support in the state as *one thirty-sixth* part of the vote, in opposition to the man that had received more than two thirds.

Does the reproach attach to the Illinois member? I think it does not, and you will say that on republican principles, Mr. Cooke did right. That little state though having but one representative in congress, is divided into three districts to choose her three electors, one district gave a *large* majority for Adams; two gave *small* majorities for Jackson; putting all together, the majority was for Adams. Cooke represented the *whole*, the vote of the whole therefore contained the *instructions* which it was his duty to obey, and he *did* obey. Can democrats censure him for fulfilling the declared will of a majority of his constituents? He has lately been re-elected, a fact which shows plainly that his constituents do not consider him as having "spurned their will" or having "insulted them, or been guilty of treachery" towards them.

Does the reproach attach to the Louisiana members? Recollect the people of Louisiana had not voted at all, the *legislature* had given three of the votes of the state to general Jackson. Two of the representatives declared they knew the wishes of their constituents to be in favour of Adams. They voted accordingly, and their constituents have approved of their act by *re-electing both*. Surely a sufficient answer to the charge against them, of having *insulted their* constituents.

Does the reproach apply to the Maryland members? Test their conduct by the same republican principle of obedience to the will of the constituents and the rights of a majority, and they not only stand justified, but could not justifiably have done otherwise. Maryland voted by districts for electors; the electoral districts were not the same as the congressional districts, the members of congress represented the *people*, and a majority of the votes actually polled, were for Adams.

This being the *fact*, the same principle which bound our representatives to vote for Jackson, impelled those of Maryland to vote for Adams. It has been said, that in some counties the friends of Jackson did not think it worth while to vote, but if they were so indifferent, they cannot complain. In Pennsylvania only fifty thousand votes were polled at the electoral election, out of one hundred and fifty thousand or thereabouts; but it will not be consistent with republican principles therefore to say that Jackson had not a majority of the votes of Pennsylvania. He had a majority of all those actually polled, and our representatives had no right to look further, nor did they, but gave their votes in obedience

so reported when this was written

to these instructions. We approve of their conduct; must we not then approve of the conduct of the Maryland members who acted on the same principles?

Here then are ten states *bound in duty*, by the republican principle of obedience to the will of constituents, to vote for Adams; eight under a like obligation to vote for Jackson, three bound to vote, in the first ballot for Crawford, and three which having voted for Clay had to determine on their course.

Now according to the plurality principle, Adams was of course and at once entitled to be elected. But I do not admit a plurality to govern a majority.

It was plainly impossible for general Jackson to be chosen, even if all the states which had voted for Mr. Clay should now give the general their votes. This would have given him only ten, or with North Carolina (the members from which had joined the Crawford party,) eleven. A prolonged contest must have ensued; perhaps no choice, or a choice by a change of the Crawford states.

Now the Crawford members voted, properly, according to their instructions, they are not liable to censure. The North Carolina members alone disregarded the votes of the people of their state, but they did not join Adams, they threw away their votes on Crawford. They alone seem to have disregarded the declared wishes of their constituents. But it made no difference in the result, and is not at all events chargeable against Mr. Adams.

Is it to Missouri that these heavy charges of "treachery," "insult," "defiance," "spurning," &c. &c. apply?

Missouri had voted for Mr. Clay. The member, Mr. Scott, not being certain how he ought to act, consulted the two senators as to their opinion of the wishes of the people of Missouri. If these two senators had *agreed* in their advice, and Mr. Scott had acted contrary to it, I would grant his conduct to be liable to suspicion. But of the two, Barton told him he was sure their constituents preferred *Adams*, while Benton as positively declared they were in favour of *Jackson*. Thus left to his own judgment he thought it his duty to vote for Adams. Surely there was nothing like spurning the will of *his* people, in this conduct. But the people of Missouri are the best judges of it, and you may see in their newspapers that Mr. Scott and a Mr. Bates are now candidates for congress, and the only candidates, and both rest their hopes of success on being declared friends of Mr. Adams' administration. The people of the state, therefore, are *not* in favour of general Jackson, and Mr. Scott *did* understand their wishes, and *did* act according to them, in voting for Mr. Adams.

Then there is the great state of Ohio, of whose fourteen members only two voted for general Jackson.

Was there "treachery" or "defiance of the people's will" there? Why general Jackson did not receive *even a plurality* of the votes in that state. The members surely best knew the wishes of their constituents. Can we presume to be better acquainted with them? They could have no inducement to offend their people, and in fact

they did not offend them; nothing has occurred in that state to indicate the least disapprobation. The newspapers in general Jackson's interest, have of course complained and scolded, but the people have not found fault and no opposition is attempted on the ground of their having misrepresented or "spurned" the will of the people.

Let us wait the result of the approaching elections there, before we entertain an accusation so gross against men in their responsible situations. If the people of Ohio have been "spurned" or "cheated," or "insulted," they will of course elect other men to congress; if the same men are re-elected, surely the charge against them is sufficiently confuted. That they will be re-elected, all intelligent men from Ohio agree is almost certain.

Kentucky alone remains to be exculpated. Now I take it for granted, that no reasonable man thinks the Kentucky members were obliged to vote for Jackson merely because Pennsylvania wished him to be elected. If they were guilty of "treachery," it was towards the people of Kentucky, if they did "defy" the will of Pennsylvania but *obeyed the will of Kentucky* they were justifiable in doing so.

They *believed* the will of Kentucky was in favour of Adams in preference to Jackson. But the members of the Kentucky legislature said otherwise. If the people of Kentucky really did not prefer Jackson—if the members of congress knew their sentiments better than the members of the legislature, were they not right to prefer the will of the people rather than that of the legislature? Now it is already certain that those members of the legislature were not of accord with the people. They were of the party called the "*Relief*" party, the *Desha* party, and since then have been entirely defeated and displaced. The election for members of congress is not over, let the question abide the result which we shall soon learn.

The constituents of Mr. Clay have chosen as successor to him, Clarke, an avowed friend of Mr. Clay and of the administration; this does not look as if Clay's constituents felt themselves "insulted" by his vote.

Here then is a majority, thirteen states voting all of them by their representatives in congress, in truly democratic obedience to the will of their people at home—and voting for a candidate of undoubted qualifications, high character, democratic principles and long services.

Can such an election be pronounced by the democrats of Pennsylvania a "subversion of the principles of 1776?" Can it be called "treachery," "cheating," "an insult to the people," &c. &c. Surely the democratic party will not sanction this madness, which treats general Jackson as an hereditary prince, to whom the people were bound hand and foot, and whom not to prefer is *treason, treachery, &c.* The doctrine is any thing but democratic—it is pure slavish legitimatism and monarchy.

But it is pretended that as one of the Kentucky delegation re-

ceived and accepted an office from Adams, this is a badge of fraud and evidence of corruption.

Can sober minded men admit this rule of evidence? Can Americans listen to such a charge against a man that has been so illustrious an ornament to his country as Henry Clay? Can democrats join in establishing a principle of proof which they have heretofore rejected, and which would involve many of the most distinguished favourites of the party in the infamy of convicted bribery?

I will not detain you with any mention of Henry Clay; his services to our party, his exalted character, his fearless course of conduct, the most remote from meanness and time serving that can possibly be; his unimpeached integrity and greatness of mind; but appeal at once to the principles and conduct of the democratic party, about which we cannot differ.

When the convention met at Harrisburg in March, 1823, to choose a democratic candidate for governor, George Bryan had certainly the greatest number of friends; among the delegates however, were some in favour of S. D. Ingham, and of these the gentleman now at the head of the Jackson committee (Mr. Dallas,) was the most active and influential.

He possessed at least as much influence with the *Ingham* party, as Mr. Clay did in congress with the Kentucky and Ohio delegations. Mr. Dallas and his friends joined Mr. Shulze, and by so doing, made him the candidate and of course the governor, although Bryan (like Jackson) had apparently the best chance, and according to the doctrines of the Jackson committee, the best *right* at first. When the election was over, and the new governor began to give offices, Mr. Dallas at once received one, and the best he could receive under Mr. Shulze's administration. Now Mr. Dallas is a man of integrity and talents; (but not more so than Mr. Clay,) the democracy of our state did not call this proof of corruption or bribery or treachery; even the opponents of governor Shulze scarcely dared to insinuate that he bought his way to power; and the democratic party approved of him and his administration and nominated him a second time, without taking exception to this act.

How can democrats admit the same circumstances to be evidence of corruption in one man, and yet consider them no impeachment of the honour of another who does the very same thing?

But how did it stand? Several appointments were to be made requiring men of first rate qualifications. Was the new president to adopt a new rule and exclude all members of congress from appointments, or was he to follow the example of his republican predecessors? He actually appointed only two of the members of the house of Representative, one had voted against him, and one for him. Mr. Poinsett was named envoy to Mexico, and Mr. Clay secretary of state. Both were eminently qualified to perform the *business* of their offices, and surely Mr. Adams could not have supposed that the democratic party would have for a moment allowed the cry of bribery to be raised when he recollected, as we

all should recollect, the course pursued by Jefferson and the approbation of it by the party, and, at length, by the whole nation.

Jefferson owed his election to the house of representatives; the contest was long and doubtful, thirty-six ballots were had before a decision was obtained. Immediately after his inauguration he appointed several influential members of congress who had voted for him, to lucrative offices.

Gallatin the most leading man of our delegation, was made secretary of the treasury. Lincoln also a leading man in congress, was made attorney general. Claiborne who held the vote of Tennessee in his hands, being the only representative, was appointed governor of Mississippi territory. *Lynn* of New Jersey who made up the majority of three to two of that delegation also received an office, as did *Dent* of Maryland; where the delegation was equally divided, so that *Dent's* vote was necessary to keep it from going for Burr. *Livingston* of N. York, and *Hill* of N. Carolina, whose votes had been first given to Burr and afterwards to Jefferson, also received appointments. And what then? Did the democrats of that day cry "bribery," "treachery," "corruption," &c? Will the democrats of this day adopt a principle of evidence that must impute to Jefferson the most abominable and extensive system of corruption; and now when his enemies have at last learned to do justice to his fame, will democrats be easily persuaded to cover his name with infamy?

The integrity, the honour, the policy, the interests of the party, as well as every manly and patriotic feeling, dictate to us to repel and discourage this accusation with scorn.

If Adams is found guilty by such evidence, Shulze is proved guilty, and Jefferson is proved guilty, and the whole democratic party share the infamy by having approved and supported Jefferson and Shulze, after these, so called, proofs of crime.

I say again therefore, there is nothing in the circumstances of the last election which calls upon the party to pledge themselves to general Jackson, and that to give such a pledge *now* would be to remove the ancient landmarks of the party, to violate its principles, to contravene its policy, and by casting implied shame on its chosen candidates, endanger its future ascendancy.

There being then nothing in the military character, nor in the private respectability of general Jackson which according to the principles of our party *obliges* us to pledge ourselves to him—nor any thing in the actual circumstances of the last election or its result—nor in the fact of his having been our candidate for that occasion—let us see if any later events have made it essential to the interests or the duty of the party.

If the conduct of the present administration is indeed such as the democratic party cannot tolerate, we may as well begin at once to take measures for their removal by organizing an opposition. If, particularly, the administration are not sufficiently faithful to the interests of our party, let us then lose no time in taking steps for getting rid of them.

But cool reasonable men like you and myself must not be carried away with boyish rhodomontade uttered by aspiring or restless young men, who would hazard the ascendancy of republicanism and violate the principles of the party, merely for the sake of stirring the waters and bringing themselves into notice.

When such rash politicians utter the charge against John Quincy Adams of being a federalist, and determined on bringing federalists into employment or influence, let us not be led by the nose too blindly, but let us look for ourselves at the fact since an ounce of *fact* is worth a pound of *assertion*.

The president, it is said, avowed himself in his inaugural address to be determined to treat federalists and republicans with equal favour. I have looked over the address, and cannot find any such thing. When Jefferson made *his* inaugural address, he recommended conciliation and the oblivion of party animosities; the parties did not exactly adopt his advice, but the democrats did not take offence at his offering it.

You and I have been democrats too long to censure a president for following in the track of Jefferson's footsteps. And a comparison of the two addresses will show that John Quincy Adams did not depart one hair's breadth from them. Let us see how they look side by side.

Mr. Jefferson says "Let us, fellow citizens, unite with one heart and one mind, let us restore to social intercourse that harmony and affection, without which liberty and even life itself are but dreary things. And let us reflect that having banished from our land that religious intolerance under which mankind so long bled and suffered, we have yet gained little if we countenance a *political intolerance* as despotic, as wicked, and capable of as bitter and bloody persecutions."

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Every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle. We have called by different names brethren of the same principle. We are all republicans, we are all federalists.

Mr. J. Q. Adams says "That the will of the people is the source, and the happiness of the people the end of all legitimate government upon earth—That the best security for the beneficence and the best guaranty against the abuse of power, consists in the freedom, the purity, and the frequency of popular elections—That the general government of the union and the separate governments of the states, are all sovereignties of limited powers, fellow servants of the same masters, uncontrolled within their respective spheres, uncontrollable by encroachments upon each other—That the firmest security of peace is the preparation during peace of the defences of war—That a vigorous economy and accountability of public expenditures should guard against the evil, and alleviate when possible the burden of taxation—That the

military should be kept in strict subordination to the civil power —That the freedom of the press and of religious opinion should be inviolate—That the policy of our country is peace, and the ark of our salvation union, are articles of faith upon which we are now all agreed. * * * *

There still remains one effort of magnanimity, one sacrifice of prejudice and passion to be made by the individuals throughout the nation who have heretofore followed the standards of political party. It is that of discarding every remnant of rancour against each other; of embracing as countrymen and friends, and of yielding to talents and virtue alone that confidence which in times of contention for principle was bestowed only on those who bore the badge of party communion."

In a subsequent part of the address of Mr. Adams, he says that "he looks to the example of his predecessor, next after these general principles, for his path of duty." Now whatever the rash, the young or the self-interested may say, you and I cannot see *in this* any departure from the good old principles and practices of the party.

Jefferson recommended conciliation, but *that* did not pledge him to appoint federalists to office, nor was it so considered at the time. Nor did he appoint them. Has John Quincy Adams? Much as I like conciliation, I am not for encouraging the federalists. But again let us look at *facts*.

The democratic legislature of New York, bucktails and all, joined in electing Rufus King to the United States senate. King had been a federalist, but the republicans of his own state chose to admit him to their confidence and give him their support. Now speaking as a party-man, I say that if the democrats in any particular state choose to adopt a man and support him as a democrat, it is not for a president to say he is *not* so, and shall *not* be considered so. Rufus King went into the senate wholly on democratic votes.

The same principles apply to the case of John Sergeant. I do not know how we can, *as democrats*, complain of his appointment. He was elected to congress by a unanimous vote of his district, being on both the democratic and federal tickets. Since then gov-

ernor Shulze has thought fit to appoint him to be a canal commissioner, a very responsible, elevated, and honourable office. If the democrats of his district thought him sufficiently a republican to represent them in congress, and the democratic governor thought him sufficiently so to be selected for his present high station in the state, what right had the president to consider him unfit for employment under a democratic administration?

The conduct of governor Shulze in appointing him has not been disapproved—his whole course of administration has been approved by the party, this act included. If the president were to select men actually opposed to, *and opposed by* the democratic party, I would give him up; but democrats cannot blame him for following their own example and employing men whom he finds actually in the exercise of offices of high trust and importance to which they have been elevated by the democratic party, as was the case with Rufus King and John Sergeant.

May I not consider it demonstrated then that so far nothing has occurred which makes it the duty of the democratic party in this state to pledge themselves either to support Andrew Jackson, or to oppose John Quincy Adams?

That we are bound to support the administration or to oppose Andrew Jackson I do not say. On the contrary I contend for entire liberty of choice as the most consistent with democracy.

Whenever we have to pass our judgment upon the question of who shall be our candidate in 1828? there is a consideration of no small weight that we must take into our calculations, totally independent of the mere personal merit or demerit of these two, and of any other man that may be offered.

A contest is approaching, in which our state is deeply interested, on a pure question of national policy. The public debt will in a few years (probably five or six) be extinguished. Then what is to be done with the revenue? *We* of the middle states say give it to internal improvements. But the southern people insist that congress have no right to help forward any such schemes, and their plan is to reduce the duties on British cotton and woollen goods so as to destroy all the prospects of our manufacturers, and at the same time stop the source of that revenue out of which I hope to see our great canal paid for.

In congress this division of opinion and designs is just beginning to be seen. The Carolinians and all who oppose the *tariff* and the system of encouraging manufactures, plainly indicate however that such is *their* policy.

Now this question will very probably have Pennsylvania on one side, and most of the southern states on the other. Pennsylvania must continue as she is now, in favour of roads and canals and domestic manufactures, and the democratic party will be sacrificing at once the interests of the state and their own permanent ascendancy, if we put ourselves on the wrong side of this momentous question.

Let us see therefore, before we adopt a candidate for the chief magistracy of the Union, with *what men* he seems to be connected in political alliances, and with *what principles* of national policy his cause is united.

General Jackson's strength lies chiefly in those states which are opposed to the application of one dollar of the national treasure to roads, canals, or other improvements, and equally opposed to the protection of our manufactures. In South Carolina he is openly advocated, because he is a "*southern man, with southern interests and southern feelings,*" and in Virginia, at the same time that the leading politicians there are said to be declaring themselves for him, the legislature pass resolutions denying the power of congress to give money for public improvements; and send Randolph to the senate because he was distinguished for his opposition to manufactures and improvements.

These are signs of the times not to be disregarded by prudent men.

I have no objection against *southern men*, but "*southern feelings and interests,*" mean if any thing, hostility to the *tariff*, opposition to the protection of our manufactures, and opposition to the application of any part of the national treasure, to the completion of our great canal as well as other works of the same kind.

Now the present administration, it must be allowed, is pledged safely enough to the principles in which our state is so deeply interested, the encouragement of manufactures and the application of national treasure to public improvements.

The present president is the first that has come out in a message to congress with a distinct recommendation of this policy; and the two most conspicuous members of his cabinet are also committed to this policy.

Now having a great respect for general Jackson, still I say, that if he were my brother, or my father, I could not join in making him the candidate of the democratic party if his success is to be accompanied with the elevation of men, and the establishment of a policy under the influence of whom, and of which, our hopes of national assistance to our roads, canals, bridges, breakwaters, &c. are to be defeated, and our manufacturing establishments, just now struggling into safe existence, are to be prostrated and ruined in order to let in British goods according to the wild theories, or selfish policy advocated by the "*anti-tariff*" men of the south.

No matter what may be the individual merits of the *man*, if his cause is associated with the triumph of such a policy. I can see nothing under such circumstances in the prospect of his elevation, but misfortune to the state, and ruin to the democratic party.

That general Jackson's success is already identified with these "*southern interests and southern feelings,*" it is impossible yet to assert, nor can we say it is *not*; time will show. Meanwhile let us not put our party in the wrong, on a question where it is now in

the right—let us pause and look before we leap—do nothing rashly—but, being in prosperity, take heed lest we fall.

Not having leisure to make my long letter any *shorter*, I must leave it as it is written,

Very truly your friend.

